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Executive Summary 
 
Staff of the King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the 
aftermath of a radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant 
quantities of radioactive material into the combined sanitary and storm sewer system in King 
County, Washington. Radioactive material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion 
device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" that are not nuclear detonations but are explosives 
designed to spread radioactive material (National Council on Radiation Protection and 
Measurements (NCRP) 2001). Radioactive material also could come from deliberate 
introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, including waterways and 
water supply systems. 
 
This document, Volume 3 of PNNL-15163 is the technical basis for the Annex to the West Point 
Treatment Plant (WPTP) Emergency Response Plan related to responding to a radiological 
emergency at the WPTP. The plan primarily considers response to radioactive material that has 
been introduced in the other combined sanitary and storm sewer system from a radiological 
dispersion device, but is applicable to any accidental or deliberate introduction of materials into 
the system. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
This document, Volume 3 of PNNL-15163, provides the assumptions and technical basis for the 
radiological Annex to the West Point Treatment Plant (WPTP) Emergency Response Plan. 
Suggestions to revisions or additions to the Emergency Response Plan are also provided in this 
report. Appendix A of the report contains the draft of the Emergency Response Plan Annex. The 
Annex is tied closely to the Emergency Response Plan, and does not repeat general emergency 
response information such as the discussion of Evacuation Procedures, Emergency 
Communications or the Incident Command System. Where appropriate, the Annex will refer 
back to the main text of the WPTP Emergency Response Plan. The Annex provides measures to 
be taken that will protect workers until a person trained in radiation protection can be dispatched 
to the plant (a consultant or an individual from the Department of Health). The assumption is that 
if radioactive material is detected in the wastewater, it will be processed and that workers will be 
trained to protect themselves using the basic radiation protection principles of limiting exposure 
time, maximizing distance between themselves and the source of radiation, and ensuring there is 
adequate shielding between themselves and the source. Personnel protective equipment (PPE) 
may also be used.  
 
Responding to a radiological event is, in many ways, like responding to other hazardous material 
releases that may be encountered at the WPTP. However, in this case, the radioactive material 
will be brought into the plant from the storm and sewer systems, and not be material typically 
used and stored in the plant. Another major difference between other hazardous materials and 
radioactive material is that it cannot be detected by human senses. It cannot be smelled, tasted or 
seen. Therefore, in order to be aware of the materials’ presence, specialized equipment much be 
available to detect the material. Volume 2 of this report addresses the recommended radiological 
instrumentation for detection of radioactive material in the storm and sewer systems outside the 
WPTP and inside the plant. Until detection capability (portable monitors and dosimetry) is 
available in the plant, it is recommended that WPTP staff use an interim approach. This approach 
is to execute the bypass policy discussed in Section 5, Hazardous Material Releases of the 
Emergency Response Plan, once it has been verified that radioactive material is in the 
wastewater. This course of action is recommended to protect workers when there is no detection 
equipment available. Once instrumentation is available and staff have been trained in its use, 
then wastewater may not have to be diverted. 
 
As discussed in Volume 1 of this report, there are two primary scenarios considered . The first 
scenario includes events that may be suspected from the outset, such as an explosion of a "dirty 
bomb" in downtown Seattle. The explosion would most likely be heard, but the type of explosion 
(e.g., sewer methane gas or RDD) may not be immediately known. Emergency first responders 
must be able to quickly detect the radioisotopes listed in previous reports, assess the situation, 
and respond to contain and mitigate (as much as possible) detrimental effects resulting from the 
incident. In such scenarios, advance notice of about an hour or two might be available before any 
contaminated wastewater reaches a treatment plant. 
 
The second scenario includes events that could go initially undetected by emergency personnel. 
Examples of such a scenario would be the inadvertent or surreptitious introduction of radioactive 
material into the sewer system. Intact rogue radioactive sources from industrial radiography 
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devices, well-logging apparatus, or moisture density gages may get into wastewater and be 
carried to a treatment plant. Other variations of this scenario include a terrorist deliberately 
putting a dispersible radioactive material into wastewater. Alternatively, a botched terrorism 
preparation of an RDD may result in radioactive material entering wastewater without anyone's 
knowledge. Drinking water supplies could also be contaminated, with the result that some or 
most of the radioactivity ends up in wastewater. 
 
These two scenarios are considered here for developing emergency response procedures to be 
implemented by the WTD staff.  
 
The Annex is designed to provide guidance and procedures to protect the staff at the WPTP. It 
will not discuss how to segregate, store and dispose of radioactive waste generated by 
contaminated wastewater. These issues are extremely important and do need to be addressed, 
however, they are outside the scope of the Annex. 
 
Rather than providing detailed specific procedures for safely dealing with and handling the 
radioactive material in the wastewater, the Annex will provide guidance that is the same level of 
detail as that in the WPTP Emergency Response Plan. To be able to effectively and safely 
implement the Annex, training of all emergency responders will be necessary. 
 
Should contaminated wastewater pass through the plant, it is likely that some contamination will 
remain on equipment and in solid effluents. Contamination remaining in the plant may or may 
not be a long term problem. Dealing with such situations is beyond the scope of this report. 
 
To develop the Annex for the WPTP Emergency Response Plan, Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory (PNNL) staff reviewed the June 2004 review copy of the WPTP Emergency 
Response Plan and toured the WPTP facility. It should be noted that the Annex is designed only 
to protect the workers at the WPTP and not other WTP workers outside of the facility. 
 
Section 2 of this report contains discussions of the WTD radiation protection standards 
applicable to the WPTP workers. Section 3 describes the basis for protecting workers from the 
effects of radiation, providing guidance on what workers can do to protect themselves and what 
managers can do to assist staff in radiation protection. Section 4 provides an overview of the 
information provided in the Annex to the WPTP Emergency Response Plan. Section 5 provides 
suggested revisions to the Emergency Response Plan. Section 6 addresses conclusions and 
recommendations and Section 7 provides references.
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2.0 Standards for Radiation Protection 
 
Radiation protection standards and regulations are implemented by a variety of agencies in the 
US, and cover dose limits for workers and members of the public, and limits on amounts and 
concentrations of radioactive materials that can be released to the environment. With the 
exception of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA, or “Superfund”), all laws and regulations pertain to licensees or otherwise authorized 
parties, who have a duty to limit radiation exposures to workers, public, and the environment. 
Under CERCLA, sometimes a potentially responsible party cannot be identified, and the federal 
government accepts responsibility. For criminal acts, acts of terrorism, acts of war, and accidents 
of transnational consequence such as the reactor accident at Chernobyl, there may not be a 
potentially responsible party to whom existing regulations apply. 
 
2.1 Regulations that, Amazingly Enough, Don’t Apply to WTD 
 
The Washington State Department of Health (DoH), Division of Radiation Protection has “Rules 
and Regulations for Radiation Protection” published as Title 246 of the Washington 
Administrative Code (WAC). These regulations refer to “persons engaged in activities under 
licenses issued by the Washington state department of health…” Since WTD does not have a 
license from the DoH, arguably these regulations do not apply. Following the same reasoning, 
the regulations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) do not apply. 
 
2.2 Regulations that Do Apply to WTD 
 
Several sets of regulations apply to WTD. 
 
2.2.1 Transportation 
 
Under the U.S. DOT regulations (primarily 49 CFR 170-179), any contaminated material (e.g., 
rags and screenings, grit, and biosolids) above specified concentrations (usually taken as 0.002 
microcuries per gram, µCi/g) must be packaged, labeled, manifested, surveyed, and transported 
in specified ways. This could result in a serious problem for WTD, and under some 
circumstances, exceptions may be needed to DoT regulations in order to reduce elevated 
radiation levels in the plant low enough to continue normal operations. 
 
2.2.2 Environment 
 
Similarly, the regulations of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would govern the 
ultimate fate of radioactively contaminated waste material such as rags and screenings, grit, or 
biosolids, as well as treated but still radioactively contaminated wastewater. 
 
2.2.3 Protection of Workers and the Public 
 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates workplace exposures for 
all sources of radiation that are not regulated by other federal or state agencies. OSHA has a 
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single regulation entitled “Ionizing radiation” published as Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) Section 1910.1096 (29 CFR 1910.1096). An agency such as WTD that does not have a 
license for the use of radiation or radioactive material is subject to this regulation. It should be 
noted that the OSHA regulation is essentially the regulation used by the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission at the time OSHA was created in 1974. Rather than referring to the “licensee,” as 
the non-applicable regulations do, the OSHA regulations refer to the “employer.” 
 
The understanding of dose limits for WTD workers requires the concepts of restricted and 
unrestricted areas. In OSHA’s parlance “[r]estricted area means any area access to which is 
controlled by the employer for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation 
or radioactive materials. Unrestricted area means any area access to which is not controlled by 
the employer for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation or radioactive 
materials.”  
 
OSHA’s dose limits for individuals age 18 and above are based on a calendar quarter, not on a 
year, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. OSHA’s limits apply to exposures to radiation “sources in the 
employer’s possession or control,” so radioactive material in wastewater or its byproducts would 
appear to be “sources in WTD’s possession.”  
 
Table 1. Dose limits for external irradiation of individuals 18 years old or older in restricted 
areas. One-tenth of these limits apply to individuals under age 18 years. 
Irradiated portion of body 
Rems 
per 
calendar 
quarter 
Whole body; head and trunk; active blood-forming organs; lens of eyes; or gonads 1.25 
Whole body; head and trunk; active blood-forming organs; lens of eyes; or gonads 
(provided the worker’s lifetime dose is less than 5 rems × (worker’s age in years − 18) 
3 
Hands and forearms; feet and ankles 18.75 
Skin of whole body 7.5 
 
Table 2. Limits on exposure to airborne radioactive material for individuals in restricted areas.  
Intake route Limit 
Inhalation (18 years old 
and older) 
Cannot exceed the concentration specified in Table I of Appendix B to 
10 CFR 20a for 40 hours in any 7-day period (40 derived air 
concentration-hours [DAC-hours]) 
Inhalation (under 18 
years of age) 
Cannot exceed concentration specified in Table II of Appendix B to 10 
CFR 20 averaged over no more than one week 
Ingestion (not mentioned) 
Dermal absorption (not mentioned) 
a10 CFR 20 is the “U.S. NRC’s Standards for Protection Against Radiation.” 
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OSHA’s limits are old-fashioned by the standards used today by other regulatory agencies 
named above. Unlike more modern dose limits,  
• the standards use the quantity dose equivalent, rather than effective dose equivalent 
• there is a separate, additional limit for intakes of radionuclides 
• there is no mention of dose to the public 
• there is no mention of dose limits for declared pregnant women to protect the 
embryo/fetus 
• reference is made to obsolete dosimetry technology (film badges) 
• there is no requirement to keep doses as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). 
 
Under 29 CFR 1910.1096, WTD could declare areas of its facilities to be “restricted areas” for 
purposes of radiation protection. If WTD did so, there are implications for other parts of a 
radiation protection program. WTD would be obligated  
• to perform surveys for radiation and radioactive materials §1910.1096(d)(1) 
• to provide adequate radiation detection equipment §1910.1096(d)(2) 
• to post areas with caution or warning signs §1910.1096(e) 
• to provide immediate evacuation warning signals §1910.1096(f) 
• to provide training for anyone entering the area §1910.1096(i) 
• to provide secure storage for radioactive material §1910.1096(j) 
• to dispose of radioactive waste to an authorized recipient or in a manner approved by the 
NRC or State of Washington §1910.1096(k) 
• to notify the Assistant Secretary of Labor of incidents within specified times 
§1910.1096(l) 
• to provide reports of incidents within specified time frames §1910.1096(m) 
• to maintain records and provide certain reports to workers and former workers 
§1910.1096(n). 
 
It is not clear as of this writing what legal responsibility WTD has for protecting the public, since 
OSHA is silent on the matter and it is unclear whether WTD has obligations under EPA 
regulations when WTD may have little no control over public doses resulting from contaminated 
wastewater. The OSHA limits for persons under age 18 could logically be voluntarily applied, or 
at least stated as a goal, and this would be better than having no limits. Alternatively, WTD 
might state a goal of protecting the public to standards met by licensees of the State of 
Washington. However, it is unclear at present whether WTD has any legal duty in this regard. 
 
2.2.4 Disposal 
 
Emergency action on the part of Washington State officials may permit disposal of radioactively 
contaminated rags and screenings, grit, and biosolids within a reasonable time. Fortunately, 
Washington State has one of only three operating commercial low-level radioactive waste 
facilities in the US, located on the Hanford Reservation near Richland. It is regulated under 
WAC 246-249, “Radioactive waste -- Use of the commercial disposal site.” 
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2.3 The “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA) Philosophy  
 
A cornerstone of modern radiation protection philosophy is the notion of “as low as reasonably 
achievable” (ALARA). A commitment to ALARA means that WTD would, in addition to 
complying with laws and regulations, “make every reasonable effort to maintain radiation 
exposures, and releases of radioactive materials in effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is 
reasonably achievable. [WTD] should make particular efforts to keep the radiation exposure of 
an embryo or fetus as low as is reasonably achievable during the entire gestation period as 
recommended by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. The term ‘as 
low as is reasonably achievable’ means making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to 
radiation as far below the dose limits in these regulations as is practical, consistent with the 
purpose for which the licensed or registered activity is undertaken, taking into account the state 
of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to the state of technology, the 
economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other 
societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to the utilization of nuclear energy, 
ionizing radiation, and radioactive materials in the public interest” (WAC 246-220-007). 
 
2.4 Current Radiation Protection Recommendations 
 
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) was chartered by 
Congress in 1964 to advise the government on radiation protection matters. Its current 
recommendations (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 1993) 
cover areas on which the OSHA regulation, 29 CFR 1910.1096, is silent. These 
recommendations are given in Table 3. 
 
The NCRP’s recommended public dose limit is 0.1 rem for routine exposure from all sources, 
but for accident conditions, it is 0.5 rem in a year, as in a radiological terrorism event. 
 
Of particular note are the recommended limits for life-saving, 50 rems to the whole body and 
500 rems to the skin. The existence of such recommendations for emergency situations should be 
recognized as indicating that, during off-normal situations, dose limits for normal, peacetime, 
non-emergency situations must be re-thought. 
 
The NCRP recommendations also include application of the ALARA philosophy. 
 
The NCRP recommendations do not have a legal standing at present, but may be adopted in the 
future for homeland security situations. 
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Table 3. Summary of the 1993 Recommendations of the NCRPa,b 
 Category Value 
A. Occupational Exposuresa  
 1 Effective dose limits  
  a) Annual 5 rems 
  b) Cumulative 1 rem × age 
 2 Equivalent dose annual limits for tissues and organs  
  a) Lens of eye 15 rems 
  b) Skin, hands and feet 50 rems 
B. Guidance for emergency occupational exposure (life saving)c  
 1 Whole body 50 rems 
 2 Skin 500 rems 
C. Public exposures (annual)  
 1 Effective dose equivalent, continuous or frequent exposurec 0.1 rem 
 2 Effective dose limit, infrequent exposurec 0.5 rem 
 3 Equivalent dose limits for tissues and organsc  
  a) Lens of eye 1.5 rems 
  b) Skin, hands and feet 5 rems 
 4 Remedial action for natural sources:  
  a) Effective dose (excluding radon) > 0.5 rem 
  b) Exposure to radon decay products 2 WLMd 
D. Education and training exposures (annual)c  
 1 Effective dose limit 0.1 rem 
 2 Equivalent dose limit for tissues and organs  
  a) Lens of eye 1.5 rems 
  b) Skin, hands and feet 5 rems 
E. Embryo-fetus exposuresc (monthly, once the pregnancy is known)  
 1 Equivalent dose limit 0.05 rems 
F. Negligible individual dose (annual)c 0.001 rems 
aExcluding medical exposures.  
bSee below for recommendations of wR and wT.  
cSum of external and internal exposures but excluding doses from natural sources 
dworking level month, a unit of “dose” from airborne decay products of radon gas. 
 
2.5 Doing More than the Law Requires 
 
The WTD should strongly consider protecting its workers and the public to modern standards, such 
as those of WAC 246 sections 220 through 254. This standard, along with the NRC and DOE 
standards, specify an annual limit of 100 millirems (0.1 rem) for members of the public. Radiation 
workers are limited to 5 rems per year, with an ALARA condition as well.  
 
WTD may be able to significantly lessen environmental impacts by treating contaminated wastewater 
and responsibly managing rags and screenings, grit, and biosolids. Such management would require 
cooperation and collaboration of state agencies for radioactive waste transportation and disposal. 
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3.0 Protection of Workers During and After an Emergency 
 
Choices for keeping worker doses below appropriate limits and for keeping those doses ALARA 
depend on the nature of the radiological situation and the amount and type of radioactivity 
involved. Volume 1 of PNNL-15263 (Strom 2005) presented a radiological risk analysis for the 
WPTP. Radiation protection options are broken down into the exposure pathways shown in 
Figure 2 of Vol. 1, that is, external irradiation, intakes of radioactive material by inhalation, 
intakes by ingestion, intakes through intact skin, wounds or injection, or irradiation by 
radioactive material on the skin (ontakes). 
 
It must be emphasized that responding to a radiological contamination event falls under the 
radiation protection category of an intervention, rather than some planned, justified, and agreed-
on practice. As a result, some common-sense actions may be needed to limit radiation doses and 
intakes of radioactive material that would not be considered acceptable for a planned, justified, 
and agree-on use of radioactive material such as medical diagnosis and therapy in a clinical 
setting. 
 
3.1 Principles of Radiation Protection and Actions Based on Those Principles 
 
Several principles and actions (“commandments”) of radiation protection are summarized in 
Table 4 (Strom 1996). Not all of these apply to all situations, so their use is detailed below in 
specific situations. For radiological terrorism resulting in radioactively contaminated wastewater, 
principles 9 and 10 are of little use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Principles and Actions (“Commandments”) of Radiation Protection 
 
No. Principle Commandment (familiar) 
1. Time Hurry (but don't be hasty) 
2. Distance Stay away from it or upwind of it 
3. Dispersal Disperse it and dilute it 
4. Source Reduction Make and use as little as possible 
5. Source Barrier Keep it in 
6. Personal Barrier Keep it out 
7. Decorporation (Internal & Skin) Get it out of you and off of you 
8. Effect Mitigation Limit the damage 
9. Optimal Technology Choose best technology 
10. Limitation of Other Exposures Don’t compound risks (don’t smoke) 
 
The “zeroth” principle of radiation protection is to know the radiological situation through 
measurements of radiation levels and concentrations of radioactive materials. Whenever 
possible, radiation protection actions should be based on measurements, not 
speculation or guesses. 
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3.2 Protection against External Irradiation 
 
By far the most likely route of exposure to WTD workers is by external irradiation. When 
radioactive material is dissolved or suspended in wastewater, or present in rags and screenings, 
grit, or biosolids, it can serve as a source of radiation. In addition, if the radioactive material 
somehow adheres to surfaces of pipes, pumps, valves, and other equipment in contact with these 
waste streams, it can also serve as a source of radiation. This means that radioactive materials 
like 60Co, which emits relatively penetrating gamma radiation, can irradiate WTD personnel if 
they are in proximity to any of those waste streams. There are numerous ways to reduce or limit 
radiation doses to workers. For WTD and the radionuclides listed in Volume 1, these include 1-5 
and 8 from Table 4. These actions are broken down into those that individuals (workers) can 
take, and those that management can take. 
 
3.2.1 Actions Workers Can Take to Limit External Irradiation 
 
Actions that individuals can take include  
• limiting exposure time by doing jobs in radiation fields quickly and efficiently, and then 
moving to an area with lower radiation levels (Table 4, #1, time). 
• staying away from a radiation source (Table 4, #2, distance) 
• ensuring that radiation-absorbing shielding is between the person and the radiation source 
(Table 4, #5, source barrier). In the case of WTD, this generally means using existing 
water, pipe walls, concrete structures, and earth berms to absorb radiation by locating 
oneself in low radiation areas. However, shielding may involve moveable concrete, brick, 
steel, or lead barriers; bags of sand, salt, cement, or other non-radioactive material; water 
tanks; and earth brought in dump trucks or moved by earth-moving equipment. 
 
3.2.2 Actions Management Can Take to Limit External Irradiation 
 
Actions that management can take include 
 
• invoking administrative (management) controls to ensure that workers take the actions 
listed in 3.2.1, above. This includes establishing restricted areas and radiation areas, and 
using postings to warn workers of radiation and contamination levels. 
• dispersal of radioactive material by dilution in wastewater or bodies of water such as 
Puget Sound (Table 4, #3, dispersal) 
• source reduction by physical removal of contaminated material (rags and screenings, grit, 
biosolids)(Table 4, #4, source reduction). This would mean removal of waste streams 
(dumpsters of rags and screenings, or of grit; trucks of biosolids) from the premises, or 
mechanical or chemical decontamination of portions of the plant (scouring the insides of 
pipes and tanks, altering pH or other chemical means to mobilize or precipitate 
contamination, filtration, etc.) 
• erecting shielding, which may involve moveable concrete, brick, steel, or lead barriers; 
bags of sand, salt, cement, or other non-radioactive material; water tanks; and earth 
brought in dump trucks or moved by earth-moving equipment (Table 4, #5, source 
barrier). 
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• dividing up “hot” jobs among many individuals so that no single person is exposed to too 
much radiation (Table 4, #8, effect mitigation). 
 
3.3 Protection Against Intakes by Inhalation 
 
As explained in Volume 1, when radioactive material enters the body, it can be retained in the 
body for some time, depending on its chemical and physical form. Since, for obvious reasons, 
workers already minimize the inhalation of wastewater aerosols, vapors, and gases, and since 
there is enormous dilution in the WPTP, inhalation of radioactive materials dissolved or 
suspended in wastewater is not expected to be a significant route of intake1. However, for 
completeness, radiation protection measures that can be taken by individuals and by management 
to limit and minimize inhalation of radioactive material are described here. 
 
3.3.1 Actions Workers Can Take to Limit Inhalation of Radioactive Material 
 
Actions that individuals can take include  
• limiting exposure time by quickly doing jobs where there is airborne radioactivity 
present, and then moving to an area with lower airborne radioactivity concentrations 
(Table 4, #1, time) 
• staying upwind from locations where there are significant airborne radioactivity levels, or 
far enough downwind that significant dilution has taken place (Table 4, #2, distance) 
• using ventilation (fans, blowers) to provide clean air or to disperse and dilute airborne 
radioactive materials (Table 4, #3, dispersal). Many of the techniques used for confined 
space entry are applicable to limiting inhalation intakes 
• minimizing the resuspension of radioactive contamination on surfaces (Table 4, #4, 
source reduction). Resuspension is the process of taking dirt or some material on a 
surface and making it into an aerosol, that is, suspending it in the air like dust or mist. 
Resuspension can be minimized by various means, from moist cleaning to application of 
fixatives. Some cleaning methods, such as vacuuming, may aggravate resuspension 
unless done with special vacuuming equipment equipped with special filters designed 
specifically for the material to be vacuumed (e.g., HEPA filters for particulates, activated 
charcoal filters for organice materials with significant partial pressure). 
• using personal protective equipment such as respiratory protection (negative-pressure 
filtered respirators, powered air-purifying respirators, or Scott air packs) (Table 4, #6, 
personal barrier) 
• if inhalation is suspected, nose-blowing, sneezing, coughing up and spitting out mucus 
from the respiratory tract can help get material out of the body (Table 4, #7, 
decorporation). 
 
3.3.2 Actions Management Can Take to Limit Inhalation of Radioactive Material 
 
Actions that management can take include 
 
                                                 
1 If radium contamination were persistent in a part of the plant, levels of airborne radon and 
progeny could grow to significant levels. 
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• invoking administrative (management) controls to ensure that workers take the actions 
listed in 3.3.1, above, and providing workers with the training, equipment, and disposable 
gear that they need. This includes establishing restricted areas, contamination areas, 
airborne radioactivity areas, and using postings to warn workers of contamination and 
airborne radioactivity levels 
• dispersing airborne radioactive material by dilution using existing or improvised 
ventilation systems (Table 4, #3, dispersal) 
• reducing airborne radioactivity levels by reducing the amount of radioactivity in the 
plant, using methods described in 3.2.2 (Table 4, #4, source reduction) 
• enhancing containment and confinement of radioactive materials within the plant to 
prevent or minimize aerosol generation and prevent or minimize evaporation of liquids 
(Table 4, #5, source barrier). This may be particularly important for biosolids handling. 
• dividing up “hot” jobs among many individuals so that no single person inhales too much 
airborne radioactive material (Table 4, #8, effect mitigation). 
 
3.4 Protection Against Intakes Through Dermal Contact and by Ingestion  
 
For obvious reasons, workers already minimize the dermal contact with and ingestion of 
wastewater that may splash or spray or become an aerosols, vapors, or gas. Since there is 
enormous dilution in the WTD, ingestion of radioactive materials dissolved or suspended in 
wastewater is not expected to be a significant route of intake. However, for completeness, 
radiation protection measures that can be taken by individuals and by management to limit and 
minimize ingestion of radioactive material are described here. 
 
In the context of minimizing ingestion of radioactive contamination, it is important to remember 
that radioactive contamination is just like dirt in the sense of “stuff being where you don’t want 
it.” 
 
3.4.1 Actions Workers Can Take to Limit Dermal Contact with, and Ingestion of, 
Radioactive Material 
 
Actions that individuals can take include  
• preventing or minimizing contamination of anything that can be ingested or come in 
contact with the face (Table 4, #4, source reduction). The “no hands above the collar 
before you wash your hands” rule that protects WTD workers from microbial infection 
will work to minimize ingestion of radioactive material. Thus, practical steps include the 
prohibition of  
o eating 
o drinking 
o smoking 
o storage or preparation of food 
o chewing (gum, tobacco) 
o application of cosmetics or lip balm, or 
o contacting the face or head (biting nails, scratching, rubbing eyes, etc.)  
in areas where radioactive contamination may be on surfaces or in the air.  
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• washing hands frequently. Good technique is necessary to washing one’s hands without 
spreading contamination. Before people wash their hands, they should avoid door knobs, 
light switches, faucets, soap dispensers, etc. Clean tissues can be used to prevent direct 
contact. When direct contact with washroom fixtures is unavoidable, the fixtures should 
be washed to remove any contamination. 
• minimizing the resuspension of radioactive contamination on surfaces (Table 4, #4, 
source reduction). Resuspension is the process of taking dirt or some material on a 
surface and making it into an aerosol, that is, suspending it in the air like dust or mist. 
Resuspension can be minimized by various means, from moist cleaning to application of 
fixatives. Some cleaning methods, such as vacuuming, may aggravate resuspension 
unless done with special vacuuming equipment equipped with special filters designed 
specifically for the material to be vacuumed (e.g., HEPA filters for particulates, activated 
charcoal filters for organic solids or liquids with significant partial pressure). 
• staying upwind from locations where there are significant airborne radioactivity levels, or 
far enough downwind that significant dilution has taken place (Table 4, #2, distance) 
• using ventilation (fans, blowers) to provide clean air or to disperse and dilute airborne 
radioactive materials (Table 4, #3, dispersal).  
• correctly using personal protective equipment such as gloves, boots, coveralls, hoods, and 
respirators (Table 4, #6, personal barrier), including “donning” (dressing or putting on) 
and “doffing” (removing or undressing) without contaminating oneself. When doffing 
disposable gloves, spread of contamination can be minimized by turning them inside out 
while removing them and placing them directly into a labeled container (for example, a 
trash bag) where they will not be handled again. 
• if skin contamination is suspected, decontamination (washing or other cleaning 
mechanisms) can help get material off of the body (Table 4, #7, decorporation). Material 
taken onto the skin, an “ontake,” irradiates the skin as long as it is present, so removing 
the radioactive material from the skin will stop the radiation exposure.  
 
3.4.2 Actions Management Can Take to Limit Dermal Contact with, and Ingestion of, 
Radioactive Material 
 
Actions that management can take include 
 
• invoking administrative (management) controls to ensure that workers follow the actions 
listed in 3.4.1, above, and providing workers with the training, equipment, and disposable 
gear that they need. This includes establishing restricted areas, contamination areas, 
airborne radioactivity areas, and using postings to warn workers of contamination and 
airborne radioactivity levels 
• dispersing airborne radioactive material by dilution using existing or improvised 
ventilation systems (Table 4, #3, dispersal) 
• reducing radioactive contamination levels by reducing the amount of radioactivity in the 
plant, using methods described in 3.2.2 and other decontamination methods (Table 4, #4, 
source reduction) 
• enhancing containment and confinement of radioactive materials within the plant to 
prevent or minimize  
o aerosol generation 
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o evaporation of liquids 
o spread of surface contamination 
(Table 4, #5, source barrier). This may be particularly important for biosolids handling. 
• dividing up “hot” jobs among many individuals so that no single person comes into 
contact with too much radioactive contamination (Table 4, #8, effect mitigation). 
 
3.5 Personnel Monitoring: External Dosimetry, Bioassay, and Air Monitoring 
 
OSHA regulations and good practice require that radiation workers (those frequenting a 
restricted area) participate in a personnel monitoring program. Such a program may include 
monitoring for dose received from external sources, monitoring for skin contamination, and 
monitoring for intakes of radioactive materials. A personnel monitoring program may also 
include workplace air sampling for personnel dosimetry purposes (Hickey et al. 1993). 
 
3.5.1 External Dosimetry 
 
Monitoring for dose received from external sources such as those listed in Volume 1 can be done 
using 
• thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) 
• optically-stimulated luminescent dosimeters (OSLDs) 
• electronic personnel dosimeters (EPDs) such as the Thermo Mk 2.3 (Figure 1) that WTD 
has purchased. 
Figure 1. Thermo Mk. 2.3 electronic personnel dosimeter. 
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Less precise, but still sensitive and far better than nothing, are pocket ionization chambers 
(PICs). PICs are charged with a piezoelectric charger, can be re-used, and are self-indicating 
dosimeters. Modern designs are quite rugged and insensitive to weather, humidity, vibration and 
impact. 
 
Less precise, and only sensitive to emergency levels of dose are the newly developed passive 
colorimetric dosimeters such as the Self-indicating Instant Radiation Alert Dosimeter (SIRAD) 
(http://www.jplabs.com/html/what_is_sirad.html), shown in Figure 2. The dosimeter is the size 
of a thick credit card and can be carried in a wallet. The dosimeters will be available to 
emergency responders for under $5 each, and are good for one year. 
 
 
Figure 2. Photos of SIRAD dosimeters before (left) and after (right) irradiation with 100 rads of 
x rays. The color bars printed with dose numbers on each side of the sensing strip is referred to 
as the color reference chart. The dosimeter is the size of a thick credit card and can be carried in 
a wallet. 
 
OSHA and other regulators require that radiation dosimetry records be maintained for radiation 
workers and stored under Privacy Act provisions. 
 
Another approach to monitoring individuals for dose from external sources is to measure 
radiation levels (dose rates in millirems per hour or rems per hour), and record or estimate the 
time individuals spend in areas with those dose rates, and multiply the dose rate by the stay time 
to arrive at a dose. For example, a person spending 2 hours in a radiation field of 5 millirems per 
hour would receive a dose of 10 millirems. 
 
3.5.2 Bioassay 
 
In the context of exposure to radioactive materials that may be inhaled, ingested, absorbed 
through intact skin, or enter the body through wound or injection, “bioassay” means measuring 
radiation or radioactive material in a person or in bioassay samples such as exhaled breath, urine 
samples, or fecal samples. Direct measurement of radiation emitted from the body can be used to 
mesure intakes of gamma-emitters like the potential terrorist radionuclides 60Co, 137Cs, 192Ir, 
226Ra, and 241Am and common medical radionuclides 67Ga, 99mTc, 99Mo, 131I, and 201Tl. Other 
radionuclides, such as the beta-emitting 90Sr+90Y and the alpha-emitting 239Pu are best detected 
in urine and fecal samples. Such measurements can be used to estimate the intake in microcuries 
(µCi) and estimate a committed dose in rems.  
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Similar record keeping requirements apply. 
 
3.5.3 Air Monitoring for Personnel Dosimetry 
 
Air samplers are available in a variety of forms. Some are suction pumps with special filters to 
intercept airborne radioactive dust or aerosols. Others are sorbents like activated charcoal. Some 
operate in real-time or nearly real-time, while others must pump for a while, have the filter 
removed and taken to a laboratory for counting, and analyzed. PNNL has led the effort to create 
a widely used document on workplace air sampling (Hickey et al. 1993) which details methods 
and procedures for performing air sampling. 
 
Measurements of airborne radioactivity concentrations can be used along with worker stay-times 
and breathing rates (and respiratory protection factors, if used) to estimate intakes and doses. 
 
3.6. Radiological Surveys 
 
OSHA and good practice both require surveys of restricted and unrestricted areas for radiation 
levels, surface contamination levels, airborne radioactivity levels (µCi per milliliter), and 
radioactive material concentrations in wastewater and other waste streams. Such surveys are the 
basis for informing radiation protection decisions. Records must be maintained of such surveys. 
 
3.6.1 Radiation Levels 
 
Radiation survey instruments such as air ionization chambers or even Geiger counters (such as 
WTD’s Inspector, Figure 3) can be used to measure radiation levels (dose rates in rems per hour 
or millirems per hour). 
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Figure 3. Front panel (left) and bottom (right) of Inspector. The unit has a “pancake” Geiger-
Muller probe built in (behind the gold screen) and can operate in count mode, count per minute 
mode, or dose-rate mode (in milliroentgens per hour, mR/hr). 
 
3.6.2 Surface Contamination Levels 
 
Levels of radioactive contamination on surfaces (in µCi per 100 square centimeters) can be 
measured by wipe tests, in which the surface is wiped with a piece of filter paper and counted in 
a laboratory. Surface contamination can also be gauged using a pancake Geiger counter such as 
the Inspector operated in the counts per minute (cpm) mode or in the counts mode with the built-
in timer. The Inspector can detect alpha-emitting radioactive material if the material is nearly in 
contact with the probe. 
 
3.6.3 Airborne Radioactivity Levels 
 
Measurements of airborne radioactivity levels (in µCi per milliliter) must be made using 
specialized air sampling equipment. 
 
3.6.4 Radioactive Material Concentrations in Wastewater and Other Waste Streams 
 
Measurements of radioactive material concentrations in wastewater and other waste streams (in 
µCi per gallon, per liter, per pound, per gram) are generally made by collecting a suitable sample 
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and analyzing it using laboratory equipment (for low level samples) or using dose-rate 
instruments such as Geiger counters (for high level samples). 
 
3.7 Personal Protective Equipment 
 
Personal protective equipment includes gloves, boots, coveralls, hoods, and respiratory 
protective gear. For scenarios at WTD, the use of leaded gloves and leaded aprons does not make 
sense, since they are effective for only a very few radionuclides and not effective for many of the 
radionuclides a terrorist might use, including 60Co, 137Cs, 192Ir, and 226Ra. 
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4.0 Information Included in the Annex 
 
The WPTP Emergency Response Plan Annex will be different from the main body report 
because rather than responding to an event that takes place in the plant, such as a hazardous 
material spill or an explosion, the event will most likely take place outside of the plant and the 
radioactive material will be brought in with the wastewater. Where appropriate, the sections of 
the WPTP Emergency Response Plan will be referenced, rather than be totally repeated in the 
Annex 
 
4.1 Purpose and Objective of the Emergency Plan 
 
The purpose of the plan will be to provide guidance to protect workers that are processing 
wastewater that has been radiologically contaminated by malicious means or possibly by the 
inadvertent introduction of radioactive source that was accidentally lost and ended up in the 
storm or sewer system. 
 
NOTE: Some levels of radioactive material may be in the wastewater from normal medical use. 
This material is not considered a hazard and is not an emergency.  
 
4.2 Detecting an Event 
 
It is assumed that prior to implementing the Annex, fixed radiation detection instrumentation will 
be deployed in the WPTP as described in Volume 2 of this report. Once installed and 
operational, this instrumentation will be used to detect radioactive material in the influent. 
 
4.3 Initial Response Notification and Communications during an Emergency 
 
There are two distinct types of notifications for a radiological event. The first is when it is known 
that wastewater has been contaminated and will be entering the WPTP and the second is if the 
contaminated wastewater enters the plant and is detected after entering the plant. Protocols for 
notifications of both situations must be in place. The first situation may require negotiations with 
local first responder organizations (fire or police) or appropriate emergency response 
organizations to make sure the necessary notifications are made to the WPTP managers so that 
they can be prepared for the material entering the plant. 
 
The second situation, where material enters the plant and detected through fixed or portable 
instrumentation will require notifications more similar to that of a leak or spill in the plant. It 
should be noted that medical radioactive wastes are routinely released into the sewer system and 
are not considered emergencies nor are they hazardous to workers. 
 
The notification procedure for outside of WPTP is the same as that provided on pages 2-4 though 
2-5 of the Emergency Response Plan. 
 
Figure 4 indicates the process of notifications for events detected both before the wastewater 
reaches WPTP and if it is detected first at WPTP.  
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Figure 4. Notification and Initial Response in case of a Radiological Event. 
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Emergency Communications during a radiological event can follow the procedures outlined in 
the WPTP Emergency Response Plan, pages 1-6 to 1-7. 
 
4.4 Roles and Responsibilities 
 
The Incident Command System will be in place as described in Section 3 of the WPTP 
Emergency Response Plan. 
 
If radioactive material is detected in the wastewater and was not previously known, there will 
likely be more impact to for the onsite Incident Commander because, in addition to dealing with 
the radioactive material in the process systems, there will be investigations to determine how the 
material got there.  
  
At the very minimum, the Washington DOH would be requested to sample the material as part of 
investigating how the material entered the system. 
 
4.5 Protecting Workers and the Public 
  
The public will be protected from contaminated wastewater prior to its entry into the plant by the 
structure of wastewater pipes and the normal controls excluding the public from pump and 
regulator stations. Also, the public will be protected from contaminated wastewater while it is in 
the WPTP by the same features. After the contaminated wastewater is released from the plant, 
the public will be protected by the same mechanisms that protect from the release of untreated 
sewage, that is dilution and release at a remote location. The public will be protected from other 
contaminated waste streams, such as rags or biosolids, by their proper transportation and 
disposal. 
 
4.6 Cleanup and Decontamination 
 
The Annex will generally address how to minimize the spread of by use of basic radiation 
protection principles. 
 
The Annex will not specifically address cleanup and decontamination of the systems at the 
WPTP. However, once the contamination material has been processed through the facility and no 
more contaminated influent is entering the system, it is likely that the systems will be 
contaminated. It will be necessary to have the DOH or a private consultant provide assistance in 
determining the level of contamination and determine whether processing uncontaminated 
influent will result in producing unacceptably contaminated effluents and biosolids.  
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5.0 Suggested Revisions to WPTP Emergency Plan 
 
The following suggested revisions will incorporate considerations of radiological events into the 
WPTP Emergency Plan 
 
Preface; page vii: Under the heading “What This Manual Covers,” add a bullet that addresses an 
Appendix to the Emergency Plan that addresses procedures for responding to a radiological 
event. Under the heading “Safety Training Program”, add a topic called Responding to a 
Radiological Event.  
 
Preface; page x: Under the heading “Regulations Met by this Plan,” add 29 CFR 1910.1096; 
ionizing radiation (OSHA). 
 
Section 3, page 3-3 under the heading “First Responder at the Awareness Level,” add note that 
response to radiological emergencies is in the Annex. 
 
Section 5, add note that response to radiological emergencies is in the Annex 
 
Section 7, page 7-2 under heading “Hazmat Cleanup and Decontamination,” add note that 
influent containing radioactive material that may have been spilled or is outside the normal 
wastewater process should only be handled by individuals trained to deal with radioactivity.  
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6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Review of the June 2004 WPTP Emergency Response Plan and a tour of the WPTP facility was 
conducted by PNNL staff to determine the best approach to respond to an event resulting in 
wastewater entering the plant that contains radioactive material. The current plan adequately 
addresses most emergency response actions such as notification, communication, responsibilities 
and protective response. Therefore, it was determined that the Annex needed only to provide 
those details that differ from response from a hazardous material spill at the facility. 
 
In order to effectively implement the proposed Emergency Response Plan Annex, PNNL has two 
recommendations to ensure successful implementation of the Annex.  
 
6.1 Training 
 
The training of staff that will be responding to the incident (especially WTD operations and 
maintenance personnel) will be necessary to be able to safely respond to radioactive material in 
the wastewater. At a minimum, the following groups of individuals should be trained for a 
radiological event at the WTPT: plant manager, on-shift operations supervisors, operations and 
maintenance personnel, and safety officers.  
 
The training should cover at a minimum: 1) basic understanding of radiation, radioactive 
materials, and their potential effects on health, 2) regulations for protecting workers, 3) the 
ALARA philosophy, 4) basic principles of radiation protection, 5) application of those principles 
at WPTP, 6) use of personal protective equipment, and 7) detecting and responding to a 
radiological emergency at WPTP. 
 
6.2 Health Physics Consulting Agreement 
 
In order to adequately protect WPTP staff and perhaps protect systems and equipment during 
extensive processing of contaminated wastewater, it is highly recommended that a consulting 
agreement be placed with a trained health physicist as part of implementation of this plan. This 
individual would be responsible for planning and conducting radiological surveys, perform 
monitoring of staff, keep records of exposure, recommend PPE and assist in determining what 
systems are contaminated after the influent has been processed and make recommendations for 
decontamination. Relying on the health physics staff at the DOH may not be feasible because if 
there is an RDD, the staff may have their hands full with other duties. 
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